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Many governments offer scholarships specifically to foreign citizens. In recent years 
both policymakers and academics have associated these scholarships with political 
influence, arguing that they generate sympathetic and influential alumni who support 
positive relationships between their home country and their sponsor. Digging deeper 
into the histories of several scholarship programs which are now being portrayed in 
this way shows they were actually set up for very different reasons. Explanations for 
why scholarships are being given to foreign citizens have changed over time, 
consistent with a Kingdonian model of the policy process. We need to be cautious 
about taking these claims at face value, an important reminder for foreign policy 
analysts more generally. 
 
Governments offer many scholarshipsi specifically to foreign nationals. The Fulbright 
Awards which bring foreign scholars to the USA are perhaps the most celebrated 
example, but financial support reserved for foreign citizens includes, inter alia, the 
British Marshall and Chevening Scholarships (FCO1985), France’s Eiffel 
Scholarships (Égide 2008), a range of financial awards offered by Germany’s 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD 2012), Australian Leadership Awards and 
Endeavour Awards (Australian Government 2012), the Chinese Government 
Scholarship Program (China Scholarship Council 2011) and the Japanese 
Government’s MEXT Scholarships (MEXT 2012).    Redistributing money from 
domestic taxpayers to foreign students may seem a perverse activity for a government 
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ultimately accountable to its citizensii. Part of the explanation is a rhetorical move 
which associates bringing foreigners to a country with improving international 
relations. Scholarships are portrayed as part of a larger effort of “public diplomacy”, 
which builds up goodwill among the populations of foreign countries (Cull 2009 
provides a genealogy of the phrase; I am using it in its contemporary sense). That 
goodwill ultimately benefits the sponsor country, and its taxpaying citizens, by 
improving relations with those countries. Hence, spending time and money supporting 
foreign visitors is seen to be serving the national interest. 
    This paper shows that, while scholarships given to foreign citizens are commonly 
portrayed as part of a public diplomacy strategy in which the recipients of 
scholarships play a key role, the stories of how scholarship programs have evolved 
can be much more complex. Literature on the diplomatic practice of offering 
scholarships to foreigners sidelines this complexity. Scholarship programs were not 
necessarily created to do what their proponents now say they do. Such goal 
redefinition is unlikely to be confined to this one example, and if goals are often 
redefined for bureaucratic convenience this has important implications for how we 
analyze foreign policy. 
 
The “opinion leader” model and scholarships 
There is a substantial literature on the political and diplomatic impact of international 
mobility programs, government schemes which fund foreign nationals to visit those 
governments’ countries (see Atkinson 2010, Leonard and Alakeson 2000, Scott-Smith 
2008, Sell 1983, Snow 2009). These discussions typically present this impact within 
the framework of what Giles Scott-Smith in his analysis of the International Visitor 
Leadership Program (2003, 2008: e.g. 177; see also 2006), calls an “opinion-leader” 
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framework. In essence, mobility is seen as influencing international relations through 
the subsequent careers of grantees. During their time in the host country these elite 
foreigners are assumed to become better-informed about that country, and often to 
develop favorable attitudes towards it. In later life they will support positive relations 
between their home country and their sponsor, and mobilize others to the same end. 
   Scott-Smith discusses the opinion-leader model in the context of the International 
Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), which is distinctive among mobility programs in 
its emphasis on political impact. The IVLP recruits foreigners to visit the United 
States specifically on the basis that they are likely to become influential in the 
relatively short term. However, the idea that mobility programs may be used to 
generate sympathetic alumni who will lead public opinion is clearly being stretched to 
notionally academic scholarships as well. Many scholarship programs claim to benefit 
their countries by generating alumni who are well-informed about and well-disposed 
toward the country in which they studied. When these programs’ administrators 
communicate with other government officials, they often point to alumni who have 
gone on to attain influential positions in society and appear sympathetic to their 
former hosts (House of Commons 2006, State Department 2012, Wilson 2010). 
Internal reviews and evaluations of scholarship programs also rely on these 
assumptions, and the actors to whom scholarship programs’ managers are accountable 
(primarily politicians and finance ministries) periodically raise concerns that they are 
not influencing effectively enough (Pamment 2011, e.g. FCO 2005, State Department 
2012) prompting officials to generate evidence which deflects such concerns. The 
belief that the purpose of scholarships is at least partly to influence public opinion 
abroad, through the opinion leader model, underlies this. 
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    In this article I will be focusing on three British scholarship programs which the 
Foreign Office, in its internal filing, has labeled as 
“Schemes which are intended to help Britain win friends and influence people 
abroad. Most of these schemes aim to attract people taking a leading part in the 
future in their field of study and in their own countries generally, or who seem 
likely to do so” (FCO 1985 section 3.1, my emphasis) 
   The opinion leader model has penetrated official thinking on scholarships for 
foreigners so deeply that by 2006 the House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs 
Committee was expressing concern that alumni were not demonstrating enough 
influence. The Foreign Secretary later echoed this worry, exhorting selectors to 
ensure that scholarships went to future leaders in foreign countries (Miliband 
2008). 
    The academic evidence that scholars who spend time living in a country actually 
do develop more positive attitudes towards it is decidedly mixed. How studying 
abroad affects attitudes may well depend on a range of contextual factors (see 
Atkinson 2010, Marion 1980, Sell 1983, Selltiz and Cook 1962, Selltiz et al 1963, 
Sigalas 2008, Wilson 2010). However, the assumption that spending time in a 
country can reliably change grantees’ subsequent behavior is clearly widespread.   
 
A Kingdonesque view of (foreign) policymaking  
Public resources are finite, and demands on them are heavy. Doing anything has an 
opportunity cost: spending time and money on one activity means not devoting 
resources to another. Spending money on foreign scholars implies not spending that 
money on citizens. The opinion leader model offers a superficially plausible 
explanation. It would be easy to observe that the proponents of many scholarship 
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programs claim they cultivate favorable sentiment toward the sponsor country among 
foreign opinion leaders, and deduce from this that scholarships targeting foreigners 
were created to generate influence among future foreign elites. However, policy 
theory would caution us against taking this observation at face value.  
    Public policy theory offers several plausible models of how some ideas come to 
form the foundations of government programs. Over the past half-century, these have 
challenged the ‘common-sense’ view that policymakers identify problems faced by 
citizens and then design programs to solve those problems (John 1998, Kingdon 1995: 
Ch5, Lindblom 1959, March and Simon 1993). From the point of view of an official 
within government, identifying an activity in which the government could become 
involved and then seeking problems for which that activity appears to be a solution 
can be just as effective a strategy. In fact, it is often more effective. When officials 
need to form coalitions with colleagues to make a joint case for an action, their most 
likely coalition partners will often be seeking solutions to different problems. 
Convincing potential allies that an action can solve both of their problems 
simultaneously (‘kill two birds with one stone’) may well be the best way to expand a 
coalition (Kingdon 1995: 78, Lindblom 1959). For example, an official in a foreign 
ministry may be concerned that their country has a bad reputation abroad. Another 
official working on higher education may worry that the quality of incoming 
undergraduates is poor. If the foreign ministry official subscribes to the opinion leader 
model, then both may agree that it would be good for the government to subsidise 
talented foreign students - without agreeing on why. 
   John Kingdon’s much-lauded model of the policy process as an interaction among 
potential problems, potential policies, and political context (1995) seems to offer a 
plausible framework for interpreting such behavioriii.  
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   Kingdon portrays public policymaking in quasi-Darwinian terms, prefiguring 
debates about Darwinian models in public policy theory (see John 1998: Ch8, 1999). 
There are a huge variety of possible policy ideas which could be implemented, but 
most of them are not compatible with the environment. Those which are compatible 
with the policy environment are much more likely to be selected. In Kingdon’s model 
of policymaking there are an almost infinite number of activities in which the 
government could become involved, and an almost infinite number of things it could 
potentially do. At any one time there are many ideas floating around in what he 
memorably labels the “Policy Primeval Soup” (1995: Ch6)iv. Many officials, 
academics, interest groups and politicians have ideas for things the government could 
do. Kingdon shows that, at least within the US Federal Government, the policies 
which end up being implemented are those which ‘policy entrepreneurs’ can 
successfully match up to problems and favorable political circumstances. The choices 
these entrepreneurs make about where they wish to invest their energy, and how 
successful they are in matching the streams, determine whether a policy is likely to be 
implemented. Hence, most of the time we observe governments implementing 
policies which match the political context, even though a wide variety of possibilities 
are being generated (Johns 1999, Kingdon 1995). 
    This seems a plausible paradigm for how much policymaking occurs. Corbett 
(2003, 2005) has already shown that a Kingdonesque approach can be fruitful in 
explaining how the European Union’s education policy has developed. In particular, it 
proved very useful in explaining why the Union has funded scholarships for 
Europeans who choose to study in other member states (Corbett 2005). In that case, 
policy entrepreneurs seeking to nurture opinion leaders supportive of further 
European integration played a key role, bringing together other actors who could be 
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persuaded that a European student exchange program would solve a range of different 
problems (Wilson 2011). 
    Kingdon’s (1995) model does not necessarily imply that policy entrepreneurs need 
to propose a new activity in order to connect the problems, policies and political 
circumstances. It is equally plausible that when a new ‘problem’ is identified, and 
political support for a solution builds up, a policy entrepreneur who favors 
continuation or expansion of an existing activity can portray this existing activity as a 
solution to the new problem. For example, if an entrepreneur were in favor of giving 
scholarships to foreign students for some reason, any new problem might potentially 
become an opportunity to portray giving more scholarships as a solution.  
    ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ can have many motives. Some are driven by ideology, others 
by self-interest. These are likely to coincide when the entrepreneurs are government 
officials, including managers of scholarship programs. Officials have vested interests 
in keeping their jobs, and if the agencies which employ them expand they may enjoy 
better promotion prospects (Peters 1995: 211-35). But it also seems reasonable that 
personnel who find themselves administering scholarships will be much more likely 
than the general population to believe that scholarship programs are worthwhile; they 
have selected into the role. Personnel who believe international scholarships are a 
good thing will presumably want to see them continue.  Regardless of whether they 
are motivated by self-interest or idealism, officials who manage scholarships should 
tend to present scholarships as the solution to problems (Peters 1995). 
    In order to succeed in delivering any goal, whether it be perpetuating the careers of 
its overseers or spreading goodwill among nations, a publicly-funded program must 
first succeed bureaucratically; that is, its officials must obtain sufficient resources for 
the program to survive. They may be incentivized to claim benefits for their program 
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which they know are sought by the disbursers of funds, regardless of whether their 
programs are optimally designed to generate such benefits (Hogwood and Peters 
1983: 142-8). Such tactical redefinition of what the program is for may well mean that 
the advertised objectives of government programs change greatly over time, even 
while they continue to do more or less the same things. Scholarship programs, for 
example, might continue to fund visitors even while narratives about why they fund 
them change (see Hogwood and Peters 1983: 14-18). To test this hypothesis, I 
explored the histories of several scholarships offered to foreigners by the British 
Government. In my examples, even the officials in charge of major scholarship 
programs appeared to be laboring under misapprehensions about what those programs 
were intended to achieve.
 9 
The Shifting Goals of (British) Scholarship Programs 
If scholarships are now being presented as tools for generating sympathetic opinion leaders 
abroad, it does not follow that they were created to do so. It is necessary to study programs’ 
historical development. 
    I have examined the development of three scholarship programs directly funded by the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. These are the Marshall Scholarships, Chevening 
Scholarships, and the UK contribution to the part of the Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship Plan which brought visitors from wealthy Commonwealth countries such as 
Canada to Britain. All three are listed in an internal government document, the ‘Review of 
British government and British Council funded award schemes’ as examples of programs 
primarily “intended to help Britain win friends and influence people abroad” (FCO 1985 
section 3.1). Their most recent official mission statements clearly indicate that they are, or 
were, intended to influence attitudes to the UK by generating sympathetic alumni. I have 
compared these contemporary interpretations of what the programs are for with the best 
information I could gather about why they were originally set up. Only one of these programs 
attracted much directly-relevant secondary literature (Perraton’s 2009 analysis of the 
Commonwealth Scholarships), so I have tracked down and interviewed surviving officials 
who were involved in the creation of the scholarship programs and traced any freely-
available archival material. All interviewees were promised anonymity, as several were 
serving diplomats bound by civil service regulations. I will discuss the three in chronological 
order of creation: the Marshall Scholarships (early 1950s), followed by the Commonwealth 




The Marshall Scholarship Scheme brings American postgraduate students to study in the UK, 
providing funds to cover their tuition and a relatively generous grant for living costs. It is 
funded by a grant from the Foreign Office, but this money flows into a Marshall Trust 
administered by the London office of the Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU). 
The Scheme is unusual in having been established by an Act of Parliament in 1953, 
apparently as a spontaneous gesture of gratitude for Marshall Aid given by the United States 
in the postwar years (Marshall Foundation 2009a). The Trust’s website gives a brief account 
of its ‘official’ history. 
    “The principal architect of the scheme was Roger Makins (Lord Sherfield) who, as 
Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign Office supervising the American Department, 
arranged for the bill to be drafted and passed through Parliament. Soon after the bill 
passed he was transferred to Washington as Ambassador where he was able to organize 
the scheme in the United States.  
    The idea behind the Marshall Scholarships was to build on the Rhodes Scholarships 
established by a private bequest a half-century earlier. The Rhodes scheme was 
acknowledged to be an outstanding success, but it was restricted to one British 
university and, in 1953-54, to one carefully defined category of male candidate. The 
Marshall, in Roger Makins's view, would extend the Rhodes Scholarship idea and apply 
it, without distinction of gender and with a wider age range, to any university in the 
United Kingdom.” (Marshall 2009a) 
    While this account is accurate, it conceals a good deal of complexity. The Marshall 
Scholarships’ early history is detailed in a file of correspondence between senior civil 
servants in the Foreign Office America Unit, including Makins, JNO Curle and to a lesser 
extent MS Russell and KM Anderson (National Archives 1952). While Foreign Secretary 
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Herbert Morrison bore ministerial responsibility (House of Commons Hansard 1952: cc1689-
70v), the files make clear that these officials made the key decisions which led to the 
establishment of a scholarship programme and the creation of an autonomous Marshall Trust 
to which the Foreign Office makes an annual donation. These officials did not initially plan to 
finance American students, and nor did they agree from the outset on what the Scholarships 
were supposed to achieve. While the Trust has continued to do basically the same things 
since 1954, the narrative about why it continues to do them only drifted towards changing 
participants’ attitudes and behavior toward the UK much later. 
 
Foundation 
The Marshall Trust was conceived in the aftermath of the Second World War, at a time when 
there had already been discussion of how Britain could recognize support given by the USA, 
especially Marshall Aid. By the time the files on Marshall Scholarships begin, official 
discussion had come to focus on the possibility of gifting an original copy of the Magna Carta 
(a mediaeval charter limiting the power of the English king) to the United States. A copy had 
been loaned to the Americans during the War for security, and had proved a wildly popular 
attraction. The Magna Carta has acquired great symbolic value in the United States, where it 
can be portrayed as foundational to a liberal political tradition which would ultimately reject 
monarchy altogether in the Declaration of Independence. A Magna Carta could have acted as 
a powerful symbol of the two countries’ allegedly shared liberal traditions, challenged by 
Fascism during the War and Communism in the 1950s. There had been speculation about 
gifting a Magna Carta to the US since the War, but interest seems to have been reawakened in 
December 1950 by Sir Evelyn Wrench, who raised the possibility of giving a copy publicly in 
a letter to the Times (National Archives 1951a). Wrench was a particularly notable figure in 
the US-UK relationship at the time, due to his famous support for Anglo-American relations 
 12 
after the First World War. Wrench was reckoned to have been instrumental in maintaining 
the Anglo-American relationship in the interwar years, having arranged the creation of the 
English-Speaking Union, a large multinational charity based in London. Wrench hoped the 
ESU would help sustain trans-Atlantic solidarity which could be (and was) called upon in the 
event of another war. The ESU had gone on to provide support to the government’s campaign 
to bring the USA into the Second World War and to lend key personnel to the wartime 
Ministry of Information (Cull 1995: 7, 23-6, 29). His intervention therefore attracted some 
attention within the Foreign Office, and senior civil servant Sir Roger Makins began to take 
soundings from his colleagues on the feasibility of the idea. 
   Unfortunately for Makins and his colleagues, obtaining a copy proved impossible. Only 
four copies of the most desirable Magna Carta, the famous 1215 Runnymede issue, have 
survived. Of those, two had to be kept in the UK according to legacy conditions, while two 
were owned by Cathedrals unwilling to part with them due to government pressure. The more 
recent, less desirable issues could have been seen as inferior giftsvi, but sending the originals 
abroad would have been either illegal or extremely controversial.  
   The Foreign Office perceived this situation as an embarrassing diplomatic and public 
relations problem (in the Kingdonian sense). Correspondence in the files (for example, a 
letter from the Minister of Labour to the Foreign Secretary – National Archives 1951b) 
suggests that influential people in the British government believed their American 
counterparts felt that Britain was almost compelled to provide a suitable gift in recognition of 
Marshall Aid. Ideally this should be made to seem like a spontaneous gesture of goodwill. 
The fact that the first-choice ‘gift’ was not available put the civil servants involved in an 
awkward position. There followed an urgent search for alternatives. There was a feeling that 
the ‘gift’ should be made when the UK was no longer obviously dependent on Marshall Aid, 
but given the country’s precarious financial situation in the early 1950s there was a fear that 
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Britain might require American aid again in the near future. The gesture needed to come 
before the government was forced to seek further aid, in order to build up goodwill on the 
American side and to avoid being seen as manipulative (National Archives 1951e).   
   The scholarship program soon to be known as Marshall emerged from this “primeval soup” 
(Kingdon 1995) of possibilities. Scholarships were seen as a viable alternative gesture 
because creating them was expected to appeal to American public opinion – Americans 
reading or hearing about this gesture would be impressed. The Rhodes Scholarships, created 
by Cecil Rhodes’ vast legacy to bring Americans to Oxford University, were clearly a model 
from the outsetvii. Even at that time former Rhodes Scholars were known to have had a 
notable impact on American public opinion, and the original plan seems to have been to 
choose people “of Rhodes Scholar type” who would take second undergraduate degrees 
before returning home. There was mention of Marshall alumni acting as a “leaven” for public 
opinion in Americaviii (National Archives 1951c). Importantly, however, the files provide 
strong evidence that the symbolism of the gesture was seen as a far more important 
consequence of creating the scholarships than any impact alumni might have on the 
Transatlantic relationship decades later. In the very early stages of the process many 
suggestions were floated around Whitehall. These included using the gesture of reciprocity as 
a cover for more clearly propagandistic aims. Proposals included sending select British 
students to the United States and funding visits by American schoolteachers to the UK in the 
hope of influencing future generations. These ideas had to be squashed by Anderson, Curle 
and Russell on the grounds that they were distractions from the task in hand: 
“It must be remembered that the object of this exercise is to make a suitable gesture of 
gratitude for Marshall Aid, any long-term advantage to this country arising from the 
gesture being incidental [...] The suggestion that the scheme should concentrate on U.S. 
teachers coming to this country [for example] would, I think, run the danger of making 
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the scheme so obviously propagandistic and limited as to distract from its value as an 
expression of gratitude” (Curle in National Archives 1951d) 
    While it was not considered problematic that, in JNO Curle’s words, scholarships for 
Americans had “the added advantage of indoctrinating young Americans with the British way 
of life” (National Archives 1951f), this really does seem to have been considered to be of 
secondary importance. The scheme was established by the most high-profile means possible, 
an Act of Parliament establishing an autonomous Marshall Trust which was to have its terms 
of reference laid down in statute, and therefore publicly visible. Agencies involved in public 
diplomacy are often granted some autonomy, but there is usually some indirect mechanism 
for the government to keep control. The British Council is autonomous, but it receives a 
block grant from the government which is to some extent influenced by the Council’s ability 
to demonstrate effectiveness in changing opinions (British Council Interview One). While the 
Marshall Trust was eventually funded in a similar way (and hence needs to rely on an annual 
appropriation) this was not the intention of its creators. In fact, it was hoped that the Trust 
could be sustained by an endowment in which the government would deposit enough money 
to sustain the scheme in perpetuity and would then have no more involvement. That would 
have made it very difficult for the FCO to use the Scholarships for the diplomatic priorities of 
the day unless the Trust’s objectives were changed by statute. This would involve widely 
publicizing a change in objectives as a result of parliamentary debate which, given the fear of 
being seen as “propagandistic”, could be highly embarrassing. In the end, the perpetual 
endowment was not created because the economic uncertainty of the time led to worries 
about any one-off endowment being exposed to a significant inflation risk (National Archives 
1951g, 1951h). Had this not been a factor, it seems that the Scholarships would have been 
completely dissociated from the Foreign Office.  It does seem that the Marshall Scholarships 
were created by a consensus of people who either had not thought through the long-term 
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consequences of their actions or else genuinely did not see targeted attempts to influence 
American public opinion through Marshall alumni as the priority.  
 
Goal redefinition 
This history is not what might be expected from the scheme’s modern objectives. Despite 
these origins the Marshall Scholarships are now very much considered part of the UK’s 
public diplomacy. One official involved in administering the scheme made an explicit 
statement that while people within the Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) – 
which manages the Marshall Scholarships – tended to believe that the Scholarships had 
originally been created as a gesture of thanks, diplomatic considerations had since taken over 
(Marshall Interview Two). A recent graduate of the scheme remembers the “diplomacy” 
objective being made explicit in pre-departure briefings. Scholars were made aware of 
expectations that they would function as “miniature ambassadors”, that “the whole purpose of 
[the] program is to bolster UK/US ties” (Marshall Interview One). Professional diplomats are 
directly involved in the final selection process, conducted by the British Council at 
Consulates around the United States. Each final interview panel contains a Consul. The 
Trust’s official website includes in its mission statement “To motivate scholars to act as 
ambassadors from America to the UK and vice versa throughout their lives thus 
strengthening British American understanding” (Marshall 2009b) – a clear statement of the 
opinion leader paradigm. 
   The ACU’s evaluation of the scheme shows a desire to demonstrate a link between the 
scheme and the strength of the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States. 
In 2008 the ACU commissioned a large survey of Marshall alumni, presumably designed 
partly to impress sponsors (Kubler 2008: 12-13). The survey is clearly designed to 
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demonstrate the impact of the Scholarships on alumni beliefs and behavior to the benefit of 
the United Kingdom. A brief appraisal (1985: 1.9.7) noted that  
“The standard of scholars is exceptionally high and, as their careers progress, 
they frequently occupy positions in American life of importance and influence 
[...] The Scheme is thus rewarding in both academic and political senses” (my 
emphasis). 
    The Marshall Scholarships are now expected to generate influence through the careers of 
Marshall alumni.  
    This comparison shows a noticeable drift in the policy objectives of the Scholarship 
scheme. While in the early stages the symbolic impact of their very existence as a gesture of 
goodwill was seen as sufficient to justify funding, today the emphasis has shifted towards the 
role of Marshall alumni in supporting the “special relationship” between Britain and the 
USA. The change is a somewhat nuanced one. It would probably be impossible to trace 
anyone who could identify a pivotal moment at which it occurred, even if they were still 
alive. Believing that the Scholarships have a symbolic value (or, phrased negatively, that 
taking American money without a suitable gesture of gratitude would be embarrassing) is not 
logically incompatible with believing that Marshall alumni support the “special relationship”. 
There may well have been a stage at which officials emphasized both equally. However, it is 
clear that the justification for funding these Scholarships offered in the 21st Century differs 
from that of 1953. Only comparing and contrasting the scheme’s current goals (Marshall 
2009b) with its founders’ aims (National Archives 1952) reveals the shift. 
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The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan 
The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan (CSFP) provides financial support for 
nationals of one Commonwealth country who wish to pursue university-level education in 
another. From the outset, the CSFP has been supported largely by the British contribution: 
Britain has always funded more awards under the Plan than any other country. (Perraton 
2009: 195). Thus, while the CSFP is strictly speaking a multilateral award program, British 
support for the Plan has been of vital importance. The British Government’s motives for 
sponsoring CSFP grants are interesting, and have already been investigated in Hilary 
Perraton’s detailed history (2009).  
   Until a few years ago the British government (like other developed Commonwealth 
countries) used the CSFP to fulfill two objectives. Firstly, it provided development aid in the 
form of access to skills and training to the developing Commonwealth countries. Secondly, it 
promoted academic mobility within the developed Commonwealth. This division was neatly 
illustrated by a division of British government funding flowing to the CSFP Secretariat from 
the 1970s on: one chunk of funding came from the Department for International 
Development (DfID) and its predecessor agencies and was ring-fenced for students from 
developing Commonwealth countries, while the rest came from the Foreign Office to 
maintain a quota of students from the wealthier Commonwealth members (Marshall 
Interview Two). For my purposes the Foreign Office contribution is the interesting one, 
because it was justified not on the basis that developed Commonwealth countries like Canada 
and Australia needed British help, but instead on the basis that bringing their citizens to the 
UK brought diplomatic benefits (Kirkland 2003: ix).  
    In the early stages of this research the Foreign Office decided to terminate its contribution 
to the Plan for developed Commonwealth countries, with some attendant controversy (BBC 
2008, Perraton 2009: 78-9). Since then, the CSFP has become an aid program to poorer 
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Commonwealth members financed almost entirely by DfIDix. However, for many years the 
Foreign Office provided scholarships to developed Commonwealth countries on the basis that 
this brought diplomatic benefits. Again, this was not simply a continuation of the Plan’s 
initial raison d’être. Well before their abrupt termination in 2008, the developed-
Commonwealth scholarships had undergone a shift similar to the Marshall Scholarships’. The 
symbolic value of making awards ceased to be sufficient, and evaluators began to seek 




The Plan was agreed in the late 1950s at successive meetings of Commonwealth Trade and 
Education Ministers in Montreal and Oxford, and the first class of Scholars left home in 
1960. While some details of the Plan’s inception are hazyx, Perraton (2009: 5-7) is clear that 
the political impetus came from Canada. John Diefenbaker’s new Canadian administration 
brought a bundle of policy ideas of which British delegates were skeptical, and the CSFP was 
only one of many. It was, however, considered “safer and cheaper than [the Canadians’] 
grander plans” (Perraton 2009: 6). From the outset, British support was motivated more by a 
desire to save face than a strategic calculation of national diplomatic interest. Much as the 
creation of the Marshall Scholarships distracted from failure to provide a Magna Carta, 
contributing to a relatively cheap scholarship scheme balanced Britain’s refusal to consider 
the potentially expensive Commonwealth Development Bank proposed by Canadian 
delegates. There also seems to have been some concern to signal Britain’s continued interest 
in the Commonwealth despite the country’s engagement with precursors of the European 
Union (Perraton 2009: 35). 
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    The size of the British contribution was driven by issues of prestige. From the outset, the 
FCO committed itself to provide at least half of the funding for the Plan out of concern for 
Britain’s image abroad (Perraton 2009: 36). The CSFP was seen as a symbol of bonds 
between Commonwealth countries, which were believed to strengthen Britain’s status among 
the Great Powers. A very visible show of British support for Commonwealth Scholarships 
strengthened this symbolism. The Commonwealth was perceived to have much greater 
political and economic importance in the 1950s than it does now (Perraton 2009: 81-3). The 
potential for CSFP alumni themselves to mobilize public opinion, by contrast, does not 
emerge as a significant theme. 
    For the universities, of course, promoting Commonwealth cohesion combined with pursuit 
of their own (educational) interests. Universities were key beneficiaries of the Plan, and their 
representatives were closely tied into its organization from the beginning (Perraton 2009: 
Ch1). Unsurprisingly, universities supported the Plan largely for educational reasons, as a 
means of bringing talent into British higher education, and from their point of view this may 
have been more significant than any benefits to Commonwealth relations. However, at the 
outset most academics couched their support in terms of its usefulness as a symbol of 
Commonwealth unity (Perraton 2009: 37). Even if this were a cloak for those academics’ 
actual motives, the fact that they chose this argument indicates that they believed diplomats 
would be most responsive to this line of argument, reinforcing the case that the CSFP was 
seen as a means to this end within the government.   
 
Goal redefinition 
While all of these arguments were present throughout the lifetime of the program, Perraton’s 
account makes clear that there was a significant shift in emphasis from promoting 
Commonwealth links towards pursuit of Britain’s perceived national interests (Perraton 2009: 
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26-7, 61). By the end of the 20th Century contributions to the Plan for developed countries 
were being justified by claims that its alumni strengthened Britain’s relationships with the 
developed Commonwealth. By the early 1990s diplomats were explicitly setting the goals of 
British awards as making “future leaders, decision makers and opinion formers” into 
“influential friends overseas” (quoted in Perraton 2009: 71).  Although they retained elements 
of Commonwealth-unity rhetoric to avoid the diplomatic consequences of being seen to reject 
the Commonwealth, the civil servants funding the CSFP came to see its role as influencing 
influential foreigners (Perraton 2009: Ch5, 184). The CSFP secretariat was certainly aware of 
the political motives behind this component of its funding, as the Secretary implicitly 
acknowledged in his introduction to a catalogue of prominent alumni: 
    “Governments offer scholarships for a variety of reasons. Typically, however, 
they represent a balance between enlightened self-interest and a genuine desire to 
help others. One motive might be to ‘win friends’ in other parts of the world, 
who, if favorably impressed, will in turn influence policy or public opinion 
towards their former hosts in later life. Another might be to provide key skills to 
the next generation of leaders and practitioners, particularly in developing 
counties, as part of strategies to improve living standards there.”  (Kirkland 2003: 
ix; my italics)  
   The first of these reflects the FCO’s expectations for its support, the second DfID’s. By 
2003 ‘winning friends’ was invoked as the primary objective for developed-country awards.    
At the same time, a study commissioned to trace CSFP alumni (Commonwealth Secretariat 
1989) suggests that the Commonwealth Secretariat was taking an interest in how influential 
alumni had become. As well as gathering general information about their careers, it very 
explicitly sought alumni who had been politically active in their home countries, regardless of 
whether this was part-time or voluntary. Although the Secretariat is tasked with promoting 
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the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole, it clearly had an interest in encouraging 
member states to maintain their contributions to the CSFP. 
    There are parallels between the development of arguments surrounding the British CSFP 
contributions for developed countries and Marshall Scholarships. In both cases, interest in 
creating scholarships seems to have been sparked by potentially embarrassing circumstances 
which were outside Foreign Office control, the unavailability of a Magna Carta and the 
Canadian delegation’s over-ambitious plans for the Commonwealth conference. Both were 
set up largely to signal goodwill. The behavior of officials involved shows that the 
symbolism of creating the awards was of foremost importance, greatly outweighing the future 
impact of grantees themselves. By the turn of the (21st) Century, however, program 
administrators were staking claims to funding on the basis that they were shaping soon-to-be-
influential grantees’ attitudes to Britain. 
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Chevening Scholarships 
The Chevening Scholarships are administered by the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities (a responsibility only recently transferred from the British Council, the UK’s key 
cultural relations body) but  are funded by an annual grant from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.  Chevening is the largest scholarship programme funded by the 
Foreign Office: it is expected to support around 700 students annually, and have well over 
40,000 alumni, by 2014 (Chevening 2013). It is actually a continuation of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS) which had existed since 
the 1980s and was renamed in 1994 by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (Chevening 2002). 
    Little knowledge of how FCOSAS was created survives among current administrators 
(Chevening Interview One) but there does seem to be an assumption that it was created for 
diplomatic ends. Speculating on the early history of the Chevening Program, one British 
Council administrator seemed confident that 
   “it would have been set up with the same principles that it has now which 
[are] to try and attract the future leaders from other countries [...] for a period of 
study in the UK, to get a good impression of the UK and to become a friend and 
possibly a partner to the UK in future years” (Chevening Interview One) 
    Again, this assumption warrants some investigation. 
 
Foundation 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Scholarships and Awards Scheme dispensed its first 
grants in 1984, and must be seen in the context of the early 1980s. This was a time of severe 
budgetary constraint. The Thatcher Government took a strict approach to public spending, 
and one of the money-saving measures introduced early in the Government’s term was, in 
effect, to greatly increase the fees charged to students who came from outside the EU to study 
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in Britain. Previous governments had subsidized tuition and controlled fees for non-EU 
students. Removing this subsidy, unsurprisingly, greatly increased the cost of pursuing a 
degree in the UK. Equally unsurprisingly, the reduction in support led to discontent both 
within the British higher education system and abroad (Perraton 2009: 60-1, Williams 1981). 
    Much archival material on the creation of the FCOSAS will not be released to the public 
for several years under the terms of the thirty-year-rule, so I supplemented the available 
documentary evidence with a set of semi-structured interviews. I identified civil servants who 
worked in the appropriate divisions of the Foreign Office and British Council (which 
administers the awards), and wrote to them asking if they could remember the creation of the 
FCOSAS or direct me to colleagues who were involved. Unfortunately many senior 
diplomats from that period have either died or are too elderly to recall any details, but I was 
able to speak with a few key witnesses to the Scheme’s early days in the primeval soup. All 
four of the officials I traced agreed that one surviving witness was the best-placed to 
commentxi. He was adamant that the FCOSAS was created in direct response to the increase 
in fees for overseas students. This was “absolutely” the primary cause and “it wouldn’t have 
happened apart from that” (Chevening Interview Two).  
    The decision to remove the subsidy for non-European students had effectively been made 
by the Department of Education and Science and the Treasury, without the Foreign Office 
being seriously consulted. The decision led to some ill-feeling in foreign governments whose 
students were accustomed to relatively inexpensive education in British universities. The 
creation of a scholarship scheme, albeit one which would support far fewer students than the 
hidden subsidy, was seen as something ministers and ambassadors could point to when 
confronted with such complaints. The FCO attempted to create such a scheme repeatedly in 
the early 1980s (after fees had been increased) but was unable to secure funding from the 
Treasury until the spending restrictions were eased due to economic recovery (Chevening 
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Interview Two). Had the FCO been able to fund them, awards would have been offered 
almost as soon as fees were increased, rather than in 1984. Giving the awards to students was 
expected to help the Foreign Office smooth relations with their governments in the short 
term. 
    Once funding was allocated, a major issue was whether the FCO or the British Council 
would control the awards. Both of these bodies dispense funds allocated to the FCO by the 
Treasury, but the British Council enjoys some level of independence. There was a feeling 
within the Council that it would use the scholarship money to pursue more long-term 
influence than the Foreign Office might (Chevening Interview Three); the Foreign Office 
seem to have been under the impression that the British Council wanted to use the additional 
funding to augment a program of British Council Scholarships which existed at the time 
(Chevening Interview Two). The Foreign Office chose to resist this, and did so successfully. 
The reason for the Foreign Office concern to retain control was that Foreign Office ministers 
had been “taking the flak” for the increase in fees and were therefore keen that an Award 
Scheme designed to mitigate the diplomatic consequences of this should have Foreign Office 
branding on it (Chevening Interview Two). It was not a sign that the Foreign Office wanted 
to handpick young foreigners it expected to go on to become key allies several decades later. 
The Foreign Office had no fixed criteria for selection besides academic promise and in 
practice would often delegate selection. 
    Given this, my best-placed interviewee was clear that the main impetus for creating the 
awards had been a desire to smooth conventional diplomacy, and any impact on the grantees 
themselves was incidental: 
   “Interviewer: So from your point of view it was primarily about 
intergovernmental relations rather than the impact on the students themselves? 
    A: Oh, absolutely.” (Chevening Interview Two) 
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Goal redefinition 
Despite its history, the Chevening Program today is heavily tilted toward the opinion leader 
model. While day-to-day management of practicalities did eventually pass to the British 
Council, Chevening is overseen by the Public Diplomacy unit of the Foreign Office (FCO 
2005: 8) and openly advertises that the awards target “future leaders and opinion-formers”, 
one aim being to establish a “network of professional overseas contacts on issues of strategic 
importance to the UK”. The most important part of the first stage of the application process is 
completion of three very short essays under the headings “personal statement”, “your plans 
for the future” and, revealingly, “are you a potential leader?”(FCO 2002). 
    Chevening awards are also closely tied to diplomats. Foreign Office influence has been 
retained since a struggle between the British Council and FCO in the early days of the 
scheme over which organization would control the Awards (Chevening Interview Two, 
Three). The British Council administers most aspects of the scheme, but the final selection 
board is made up of representatives from both the British Council and the Embassy (FCO 
2002). When announcing cuts to the scheme in 2008, the Foreign Secretary took great care to 
stress that the foreign policy impact of this decision would be limited by more careful 
targeting of the awards based on grantees’ potential influence in the future. The FCO would 
    “select more carefully to ensure our scholars really are potential future 
leaders, with our heads of mission having personal responsibility for ensuring 
their posts are getting this right.” (Miliband 2008)xii 
    This emphasis on recruiting future leaders ties Chevening closely to the opinion-leader 
model. 
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A Pattern of Goal Redefinition 
While the three scholarship programs I have examined may now be seen as means to produce 
sympathetic opinion-leaders, they all seem to have been created primarily to signal goodwill 
and evade potentially embarrassing diplomatic situations. The unavailability of a Magna 
Carta, unwelcome Canadian suggestions for Commonwealth projects, and increases in 
overseas student fees by other government departments which did not consult the Foreign 
Office, all provoked the creation of programs which are now justified on the basis that they 
generate sympathetic alumni. 
    These historical sketches are more compatible with Kingdon’s (1995) model of how 
policies come into being than any “rational” (March and Simon 1993) view of policymaking. 
In many respects this analysis also complements Pamment’s (2011) finding that public 
diplomacy bodies change in response to different means of evaluation. In all three cases, 
alternative activities in which the government could become involved floated around in the 
“primeval soup” before officials settled on scholarships for foreign students. In each case, 
circumstances changed to make a situation which had previously been considered acceptable 
(that promising foreign students could not afford to study in the UK) into a problem. While 
these situations did not create the kind of national debate which often features in Kingdon’s 
account, and they probably went unnoticed by the vast majority of the British public, they 
could have been highly embarrassing to the officials involved. Accordingly, those officials 
may have selected a familiar activity and matched it to the new problem.  
    My studies do not provide direct evidence as to why these programs have converged on the 
opinion-leader model. It may well be impossible to generate direct evidence, because the 
change has taken place over several generations of officials. John (1999: 44-5) emphasizes 
that transmission of ideas between policymakers can be imperfect, much like in a game of 
‘Chinese Whispers’ – the information transmitted is slightly altered with each transmission. 
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Thus, bureaucracies do not retain information (presumably including information about what 
they are supposed to achieve) perfectly over time. Hence, there may not be one individual 
eyewitness who can identify a shift from one primary objective to another, and so I have not 
sought such key individuals. While I cannot provide empirical evidence that there are no such 
eyewitnesses waiting to be discovered, we can deduce that it is likely. In their absence, how 
can we explain why officials have converged on the ‘opinion-leader’ model? In the absence 
of direct evidence can only rely on deduction to suggest possibilities. 
    One possible explanation for this convergence on the opinion-leader model is that it ages 
well: while my evidence suggests that these scholarships were actually created to address 
short-term concerns, the opinion-leader argument would seem to be more likely to secure 
continued financial support in the long run. 
     There is a big difference between creating a program and operating it, and creating 
opinion leaders is a benefit of operating. Many of the arguments which surrounded the 
creation of the programs applied specifically to creation. If the aim of a scholarship program 
is to symbolize goodwill, or avoid short-term embarrassment, then it clearly does so in the 
first year in which it operates. The sponsoring government is very publicly engaged with it, 
and it is likely to attract publicity. Once the program has been running for several years, the 
positive signaling effect of running it for another year is less obvious. The personnel who set 
up the scheme have moved on and management has been passed to a new generation of 
officials. There is no longer a clear link to the will of political leaders, who have simply 
inherited a scheme. Publicity is likely to fade.  
   However, someone still has to operate the program. Actively ending scholarships might 
well be interpreted as a negative diplomatic signal. It would also incur the costs which 
Hogwood and Peters (1983: 14-8) identify in terminating any government program. 
Influential beneficiaries and supporters, which these schemes are designed to recruit, may be 
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hostile to change. Staff may be attached to the program. Particularly with scholarship 
programs, officials may find themselves in the role because they personally believe that 
studying in a foreign country is a life-affirming experience and want others to enjoy the 
opportunityxiii. But to defend their programs from other agencies, eager to cannibalize them 
for resources, administrators need to be able to tell a story about the benefits those programs 
bring now. For international scholarships and exchange programs these stories seem to have 
converged on the opinion-leader model.    
   Generating sympathetic alumni would be a benefit of operating the program. For every 
year that the program runs at a given level of resource there would seem to be a similar added 
chance of impressing a grantee who will go on to bring diplomatic benefits. Doubling the 
number of grantees would double the odds of including someone who will go on to be, for 
example, an influential diplomat in the futurexiv. Administrators will encounter difficulty in 
making a case for expansion of their programs on the basis that setting them up sent useful 
signals; the best they could hope for would be stagnating support. But the opinion-leader 
model could support a case for expansion. The marginal benefit of adding another grantee to 
the program could outweigh the marginal financial cost of supporting them. In other words, if 
supporting an extra student were to cost £10000, it is sensible to argue that this could 
generate more than £10000-worth of benefit to the UK. It would be difficult to do this on the 
basis that scholarships are symbolic. The symbolic benefit of funding the first hundred 
scholars is significant, whereas the marginal benefit of adding a second hundred is much less 
obvious. If exchange programs are presented in terms of impact on grantees, the marginal 
benefits are much clearer. If there is an impact, doubling the number of scholars would 
(almost) double the diplomatic benefits. This offers a viable case for expansion. 
    The evidence presented here cannot, of course, prove that this is the reason that different 
scholarships have converged on one form of justification. It may not be possible to discover 
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for sure why this convergence has occurred. This deduction seems plausible: we know that 
Foreign Office officials have been under pressure to explain what benefit spending on their 
programs brings, and we know that they have converged on an argument which might secure 
those programs’ futures. Although further research might uncover a less circumstantial 
explanation, it is possible that the nature of slow change over time may conceal the process. 
     What my evidence certainly cannot show is that officials responsible for the programs 
made conscious decisions to change their arguments. The natural personnel changes as 
previous administrators retire or are redeployed will affect the balance of arguments about 
why a program is doing what it does. New generations of administrators have to rationalize 
their activities for themselves. They may want to see their programs continue for a 
constellation of reasons, but their programmes’ odds of survival should be greater if they 
publicise those reasons most likely to secure support. Just as in Kingdon’s model of policy 
creation, those are likely to be the arguments which appear to offer a solution to a problem. 
The opinion-leader model suggests that scholarship programs can help to ‘solve’ poor 
international relationsxv.  
    While identifying policy entrepreneurs who create programs may seem relatively 
straightforward, identifying individuals who redefine their goals may well be much more 
difficult. The creation of a program is clearly something all individuals involved will be 
aware of. Goal redefinition may result from the calculation of a lone genius seeking to protect 
a program by rebranding it, but it might also result from a slow drift, driven by the succession 
of new generations of administrators, with intermediate stages in which both symbolism and 
cultivation of alumni are seen as primary benefits of giving scholarships. I have suggested 
one plausible reason for such a process to occur; there may well be others.   
    This change is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, the trend in studies of public diplomacy 
has been to stress the importance of two-way communication (Mellissen 2007) in a way that 
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the opinion-leader model suggests scholarships do and the symbolic view of scholarships 
does not. But this does not imply that the shift was a calculated decision. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that this pattern of objective drift can be observed in the British Foreign Office does 
not necessarily mean that it is widespread elsewhere. Further research would be needed to 
show that this dynamic is not due to some idiosyncrasy of the British system. It is certainly 
true that many other countries give scholarships to foreign nationals, and justify this at least 
partly on the grounds that this will bring diplomatic advantages in the future (see e.g. 
Australian Government 2012, Egide 2008, MEXT 2012). It is not impossible that 
policymaking in these countries is more logical, and they created scholarship programs as a 
means to build up a corps of sympathetic alumni in influential positions around the world. 
However, I think there are good grounds to expect that any future research would find similar 
inconsistencies in other countries as well. Kingdonesque interpretations of how policies are 
made have proven robust in several different contexts (e.g. Corbett 2005). 
    Why is this significant? Firstly, I have offered a case study to show that foreign policy 
activities can be redefined according to the logic of the bureaucracies which manage them. 
Foreign policy objectives may have changed, but civil servants have continued to do basically 
the same things (give scholarships); their activities have simply been relabeled as means to 
different ends. This complexity is rarely (if ever) acknowledged by analysts interested in the 
potential for scholarships to improve international relations, whose arguments are typically 
rooted in the opinion-leader model (e.g. Snow 2009). There is a fair amount of academic 
interest in how scholarship programs might bolster a country’s ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004). 
Maybe they do, but it is helpful to be aware that these academic analyses are themselves 
intertwined with this redefinition of what government programs are for. Academics talk to 
diplomats and read their statements. If contemporary diplomats themselves have an 
inaccurate view of what has been going on, this may affect academics’ interpretations. 
Because concepts of soft power and the formal study of public diplomacy have coalesced 
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relatively recently within the IR community, the creation of actual programs under scrutiny 
predates them. Taking the opinion-leader model of what scholarship programs are for at face 
value is tempting but may be misleading. Assuming that how states behave towards each 
other is determined by clever calculations is tempting but may be misleading. Presenting 
these programs to readers as if they were created to mould the attitudes of opinion-leaders is 
tempting but would be misleading. 
   We need to remember that policymaking can be chaotic and unpredictable,  that is not safe 
to assume that means correspond with ends, or that declared objectives correspond with what 
a program is actually set up to do. These concerns are just as relevant when considering a 
foreign ministry as any other organ of government. Given the raft of very important things 
that foreign ministries do, if goal redefinition applies to other activities as well as giving out 
scholarships then it is important to be aware of it. Foreign policy analysis needs to take into 
account that the policies we see implemented may not result from intelligent design, but from 
quasi-Darwinian selection of competing possibilities in which those best-suited to the 
political context will win out (see John 1998). 
    Nothing in what I have written here can show that scholarship programs do not bring 
advantages to the countries which sponsor them. It is possible that the opinion-leader model 
reflects some ‘objective’ reality, whatever that might mean (see Scott-Smith 2008), although 
the fact that officials appeal to the opinion-leader model does not prove that. It would be 
difficult to deny the benefits to the individuals who receive scholarships, or the institutions 
which host them, and these might justify the cost even if there are no political benefits. I have 
certainly not suggested that officials who manage them are in any way nefarious, or are 
putting their personal interests ahead of the public interest. Goals can be redefined over time 
even while everyone involved continues to behave commendably. However, we should not 
take the stories we are told about what scholarships are designed to do at face value – any 
 33 
more than we should uncritically accept any other official narrative about what foreign 
policies are intended to achieve.
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Interviews 
British Council Interview One (April 2008) An official responsible for evaluating British 
Council performance of its quasi-diplomatic objectives. 
Chevening Interview One (July 2008) A British Council official administering the Chevening 
Program in the late 2000s. 
Chevening Interview Two (January 2009) A diplomat responsible for creating the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS). 
Chevening Interview Three (April 2009) A senior British Council official of the early 1980s 
who was involved in the Council’s reaction to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS). 
Marshall Interview One (December 2007) A student who received a Marshall Scholarship to 
study in the UK in the 2006-7 academic year. 
Marshall Interview Two (March 2008) An administrator at the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities, responsible for organizing the Marshall Scholarships in 
the late 2000s. 
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i Similar considerations may well apply to other mobility programs, for example those which allow military 
personnel to train in a foreign country (Atkinson 2010) or allow foreign professionals to visit (Scott-Smith 2003, 
2006).   
ii Of course, foreign student make important contributions to their host society, as teaching assistants, 
consumers, volunteers etc. This does not explain why a select group of international students receive generous 
funding from the host government when many others would pay handsomely to take their places. 
iii Kingdon’s model, in turn, is a substantial refinement of Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972). 
iv This image refers to a hypothetical early stage in the evolution of life. In the beginning, simple organic 
molecules are believed to have floated around together in puddles resembling soup. When conditions 
(temperature, mineral levels, etc) were right, these molecules supposedly joined together and formed the first 
proteins. From that point on, Darwinian selection can explain how life as we know it evolved from those first 
proteins. John (1998) builds on this evolutionary idea. 
v While Morrison was in opposition by  1952, this Hansard records a public acknowledgement of his role by his 
successor 
vi One of the less-desirable copies of the Magna Carta was eventually moved to Washington in the 1980s thanks 
to the significant financial inducements of private billionaire Ross Perot; it became a successful attraction at the 
National Archives (Reynolds 2007) 
vii The original plan was to concentrate all the Marshall Scholarships at Cambridge University, on the grounds 
that Oxbridge would “naturally” make a greater impression than other universities and because Oxford already 
had Rhodes. A large chunk of the filing is taken up with disagreements over whether other universities should 
be included before it was decided to leave choice of institution open. 
viii The first reference to this term on file is actually a handwritten correction in which “leaven” replaces the 
original typing of “lever” (National Archives 1951c). It is difficult to be certain of whether the original typing 
was simply a clerical error, and this could change the meaning of the passage. However, subsequent 
correspondence adopts the term “leaven”. Incidentally, the scheme has since become dominated by research 
postgraduates instead. 
ix A small number of awards for developed Commonwealth countries have been reintroduced, but these are co-
funded by Universities and the education ministry, as opposed to the Foreign Office.  
xAs Perraton (2009: 8) puts it, “at least four Canadian academics [lay] claim to its paternity”. While the details 
are complex, there are two interesting links with the Marshall story. As with Marshall, existing international 
scholarships may well have been models, as these Canadian academics had received such scholarships as 
students. Another link was that a key player in the British delegation which agreed the CSFP was senior 
diplomat Sir Roger Makins, aka Lord Sherfield, father of the Marshall Scholarships (Perraton 2009: 6 n4).  
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xiThis interviewee was identified in private correspondence with two other civil servants as the key decision-
maker.   
xiiHow responsibility could be assigned if the benefits might not be seen within those officials’ careers remained 
unclear. 
xiii Most of the officials I met had previously studied abroad; unsurprisingly, given their subsequent careers, they 
had positive experiences. 
xiv The relationship would probably not be entirely linear as the most promising grantees would be recruited 
first. 
xv This would explain the intense interest in them in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (e.g. Leonard, Small and 
Rose 2005, Ross 2003), when perceptions of America in Muslim-majority countries came to be defined as a 
serious problem. 
